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GOD IS NOT THE AUTHOR OF SIN:
AN ANSELMIAN RESPONSE TO MCCANN
Katherin A. Rogers

Following Anselm of Canterbury I argue against Hugh McCann's claim that
a traditional, classical theist understanding of God's relationship to creation
entails that God is the cause of our choices, including our choice to sin. I ex
plain Anselm's thesis that God causes all that has ontological status, yet does
not cause sin. Then I show that McCann's God, if not a sinner, must nonethe
less be an unloving deceiver, McCann's theodicy fails on its own terms, his
proposed requirements for moral authenticity are insufficient, and his sug
gestion that his universe is "safer" than Anselm's is misguided.

Hugh McCann asks a pressing question in the title to a recent article, "[Is
God] The Author of Sin?" His answer is, yes! He argues that on a tradi
tional understanding of divine sovereignty we must suppose that God's
creative activity causes our existence complete with our choices. He writes
that, "God [is] the author of sin in one sense: namely, that he is the First
Cause, as tradition would say, of those acts of will in which we sin. All of
our willings owe their existence immediately to God, just as we do, and
could never take place but for his active participation, in the form of will
ing that they occur."1 His proof is that we cannot make sense of the idea
that, though God is the cause of everything with ontological status, we
ourselves and not God cause the existence of our choices. (His thesis is that
both we ourselves and God cause our sin, but in different orders of being.)
He goes on to argue that, though God is the author of sin, He is not sinful
Himself. McCann grants that his position conflicts with the traditional free
will defense, since he explicitly denies the claim that all the wickedness
and consequential suffering originates ultimately with creatures and not
with God. But he proposes an alternative suggestion for why a good God
would allow, and in fact produce, all the wickedness and suffering of the
actual world. He concludes by arguing that his view does not undermine
our claim to authenticity as moral agents.
In this paper I argue first, following Anselm of Canterbury, that it is
possible to analyze choice in a way which allows that all that has being
comes from God without that making Him the author of sin. I go on to
show that, although on McCann's understanding of "sin" he may succeed
in showing that his God is not a "sinner," he needs to address the further
charges that his God is an unloving deceiver. I argue that his proposed
theodicy fails even on its own terms and that moral authenticity requires
more than his analysis allows. I conclude with some thoughts on our de
sire for "safety."
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Anselm on Created Agency
McCann, quite rightly in my view, subscribes to what might be called a
traditional understanding of classical theism which sees God as the ab
solute, immediately sustaining source of all that is not Himself. Many
contemporary philosophers of religion seem to assume a much more di
minutive divinity. For example, some seem to suppose a god who set
things in motion "in the beginning," and who knows what's going on
and perhaps interferes with the universe periodically, but does not keep
everything in being from moment to moment. Others (Molinists for in
stance) propose something like Plato's demiurge who is confronted by
a set of independently existing propositions which function as a frame
work constraining his creation. But if one insists upon the traditional con
cept of divine omnipotence and sovereignty, one faces a difficult task in
carving out a place for created agency. McCann, following Augustine and
Aquinas, settles for what I term "secondary" agency, on the model of sec
ondary causation in general. In speaking of natural causes, it is correct to
say that some natural event, the burning of the fire for example, is a real
cause of some natural effect, like the reducing the cotton to ash, though
the entire system, all the objects and properties and events, are imme
diately willed and caused by God (the distinction between willing and
causing is quoad nos since willing and causing are one to God). God is the
primary cause and the fire is the secondary cause. So with human agency,
according to McCann. It is correct to say that you cause your choice, but
you, and everything about you, all your properties and actions, are im
mediately caused by God. The problem, of course, is that then God is the
author of sin.
McCann's basic defense of the position that a creature can have only
secondary agency is that, given traditional, classical theism it makes no
sense to suppose that the creature can cause the actual existence of any
thing at all. Further, McCann argues that positing that the created agent
causes a choice must lead to a vicious regress. In order to bring the choice
into being, it would have to engage in a previously chosen activity, which
choice would have to be preceded by yet another, etc.2 One way to attack
this latter claim might be to note that McCann himself posits at least one
agent, God, who brings choices into being presumably without any vi
cious regress, and so such a thing is not impossible simpliciter. And if it is
possible for some agent to create a choice, and God is omnipotent, ought
He not to be able to create an agent who can create a choice? Perhaps not.
God cannot create all possible beings. For example, it is possible for some
being, God, to exist as uncreated, but He obviously cannot create an un
created being. So maybe it is just not possible for God to impart his sort of
truly independent, creative agency to creatures.
But maybe it is possible for Him to impart a dim reflection of divine
aseity. I propose to argue that created agents can indeed choose from
themselves, such that their choices are not produced by God, even though
God is the source of all that has being. The proposal here is based on the work
of Anselm of Canterbury in his efforts to deal with issues very similar
to those raised by McCann. Anselm's analysis is extremely complex and
sophisticated, and I will not begin to do it justice here.3 I think I can say
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enough, though, to cast doubt on McCann's claim that primary, created
agency is just impossible. Anselm's thesis is this: absolutely everything
that is not God is from God. That means that all the existents involved
in a human choice are immediately, causally sustained by God. Anselm
sees these existents as the faculty of the will itself, and the desires which
result in a choice. In the case of rational agents, God creates in us two sorts
of desires. There is the desire for "benefit," that is, whatever we believe
will make us happy. All things with wills, including lower animals, desire
benefits, and no one is motivated except by a desire for benefit. However,
God creates in rational agents a second order desire for what he terms
"justice."4 In desiring justice we desire that our desire for benefit should
be properly ordered in accord with the will of God. Sometimes we may
find ourselves wanting something that we believe will make us happy,
but which we hold to be outside of what we justly ought to desire. In such
a situation the desire for justice comes in conflict with the desire for (this
particular) benefit. Sin consists in pursuing the benefit contrary to justice.
And it is entirely up to the created agent whether he clings to the justice or
throws it away by willing the benefit.5
Does this mean that there is some thing, the choice, which is not made
by God? Well, there are things and things. There is an aspect of the event
of you choosing sin over justice, or justice over sin, which is entirely up
to you. But this aspect, though decisive, is nothing with ontological sta
tus. What a choice consists in is simply a desire reaching its conclusion,
and the desire is given by God. In the case of conflicting desires Anselm
suggests something very similar to the hypothesis of plural parallel pro
cessing which Robert Kane proposes in an effort to solve libertarianism's
"intelligibility problem."6To make the point clear, first suppose an agent
has only one, god-given desire and follows it to its conclusion—e.g., God
makes you and He creates in you a desire to eat which you follow to the
point where you eat. Nothing in this scenario suggests any limitation
on divine sovereignty or omnipotence. Absolutely everything is caused
by God. But the situation is not so different with conflicting, god-given
desires. You are trying to succeed, not at pursuing a single desire, but
rather at pursuing two different desires both of which cannot be real
ized. Whichever desire eventually "wins out," it came from God. Every
thing in the choice is caused by God. You did not bring anything new
into being, any more than if you had had but a single god-given desire
to follow.
But if you had had only one desire to follow, you, the created agent,
would not have any input in the choice at all. You would, like the lower
animal, simply be doing what God made you to do, like the good dog
or horse which wills as it ought to will because it cannot choose other
wise. Human beings are more impressive in that they can step back from
their immediate desires, and choose that those desires should accord with
the will of God. It is this ability which gives the created agent a measure
of aseity, a reflection, however minute and dim, of God's independence.7
Granted, this ability to choose rightly does not confer much independence
on the creature, nor does it confer any real creative power at all. In a good
choice, every thing in the choice, and all its properties including its good
ness come from God. In a sinful choice, every thing comes from God, and
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the only property which can be credited to the created agent is the sinful
ness, which isn't any sort of a thing at all, being only the absence of the
justice that ought to have been there.8 Still, it is up to the created agent
alone whether it will cling to justice or throw it away.
Anselm does not ignore or try to soft-pedal the intellectual discomfort
involved in his libertarian analysis of created freedom. The existence of
conflicting desires can be attributed to God's causal activity. The "winning
out" of one desire over another cannot be explained in terms of anything
at all, beyond the bare fact of the agent's success in following the "win
ning" desire. Robert Kane holds that so long as the agent succeeds in his
intended goal he is responsible, even if success at a conflicting goal was
equally possible. But still, if the question is, what ultimately explains the
preference of one option over another, there is no answer, and Anselm
seems less sanguine about this conclusion than Kane. Anselm ends his
discussion of this issue, what would today be termed the "intelligibility
problem," by saying that a free choice, "[is] its own efficient cause and ef
fect, if such a thing can be said."9
Anselm recognizes that his conclusion involves having to accept some
unintelligibility when it comes to created agency. And it involves saying
that the decisive aspect of the choice, what is really up to the choosing
creature, is not any sort of thing at all. Perhaps these conclusions are prob
lematic. But what other options do we have? If McCann is right, we can
allow that God is author of sin, or give up on the God of the tradition
altogether. I turn now to McCann's argument that tracing sin back to God
as its cause is not such a bad move after all.
God an Unloving Deceiver
McCann argues, rightly it seems to me, that his view that God causes us
with our sin does not make God a sinner. McCann's analogy of the au
thor to the literary creation is telling here. Shakespeare causes Hamlet to
stab Polonius, but Shakespeare does not stab Polonius. Hamlet wickedly
commits a murder (surely he did not really believe it was "a rat" behind
the arras!), for which he is responsible. Shakespeare is responsible for the
entire situation in all its details, but he is not wicked and responsible for a
murder. God may cause us sinning, without Himself being a sinner.
But can McCann's God escape the charge of being a deceiver and unlov
ing? McCann analyzes sin as the deliberate choice to act against the com
mand of God. God cannot be a sinner because He is not in authority over
Himself and does not give Himself commands. Note that McCann, unlike
Anselm, does not see human virtue as reflective of the will or nature of
God. Anselm sees sin as deliberately choosing against the will of God, and
God inevitably wills that all creatures should flourish by actualizing their
natures, becoming the most perfect and fully realized instances of what
they are. In this way each creature pursues its own "truth" thus imitat
ing God's nature as the absolute standard for Perfect Truth.10 This is what
enables us to give content to the attribution of goodness to God. We have
some grasp of the goodness of the divine nature through understanding
its reflection in the metaphysical and moral goodness of creatures.11 This
move from created goodness to divine goodness is closed for McCann
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who apparently sees virtue as consisting in deliberately choosing to fol
low God's commands, which commands do not follow from the divine
will or nature. God commands created agents to do one thing and then
wills that they do the opposite.
So on a general level, it is hard to see how McCann will unpack the
claim that God is good in some recognizable sense. And it is very hard to
see how McCann will defend the ascription to God of the standard divine
virtues of being truthful and loving. McCann must certainly grant that
God causes deception. Traditionally ignorance is held to be a result of sin,
and so on the Anselmian account, God is not the author of deceit. But
McCann must hold that insofar as any created believer is deceived, God
made them in their mistake. This is uncomfortable in that it rules out the
long and distinguished tradition, from Plato to Plantinga, of positing God
as the guarantor of knowledge, connecting the knower to the known. Per
haps McCann will argue that being the author of deception does not make
God a deceiver, just as being the author of sin, does not make God a sinner.
Othello is deceived, but it would be strange to say that Shakespeare, and
not Iago, had deceived him.
But what about those divine commands? In explaining the point about
how God is not in authority over Himself and so cannot disobey His com
mands and be a sinner, McCann gives the analogy of the father's command
to the son to be home by midnight. Although the industrious philosopher
might be able to devise exotic counter examples over which we need not
tarry, as a rule a sincere command entailing obligation on the part of the
commandee must intend to instill in him two beliefs. It must instill the
belief that the commander wants to be obeyed. Suppose the father has
insisted that the son spend the night at his cousin's house, a thing the son
is loath to do, and then jokingly commands him to be home by midnight.
The son is under no obligation to be home by midnight because he knows
it is not really what his father wants. Further, the command must intend
to instill the belief that it is possible for it to be obeyed. This is because
presumably it cannot be the case that you ought to do something which it
is not possible for you to do. A serious command demanding obedience
would entail that both the commander and the commandee believe that
the commandee can obey. If father and son both know that, given the son's
location and the laws of physics, he cannot be home by midnight, it would
be irrational of the father to seriously issue the command, and the son
could not be obligated to obey it. When someone issues a command, then,
the tacit entailments are that he wants to be obeyed and he believes it is
possible that he can be obeyed. It follows that, on McCann's account, when
God commands He deliberately deceives in that He knowingly conveys
that He wants to be obeyed and He believes it is possible that He should
be obeyed, when in fact, in the cases where He causes sin, He does not
really want to be obeyed and He knows it is not possible for the sinner to
have obeyed in any case.
The case for McCann's God being unloving is even more straightfor
ward. If you love someone you desire their good. God, on McCann's view,
creates sinning agents whom He will eternally damn for their sins. Per
haps, as the Augustinian tradition holds, it is better to exist in eternal
damnation than not to exist at all, and so Hell is better than nothing. In an
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Anselmian universe in which God leaves creatures free to sin, this point
would explain why God does not permit the sinful to simply destroy
themselves utterly and blink out of being. But it would be perverse to
insist that eternal damnation is the good of the creature that love would
desire. If McCann does not want to embrace universalism he is committed
to God's wanting and causing terrible, permanent harm to at least some
of his creatures.
McCann's Alternative Theodicy
Can it be argued that, though God is the author of sin, and hence deceit
ful and unloving, He is nonetheless good? Perhaps His deceiving most
of his created agents—those who do not accept that God is the author of
sin—and causing permanent harm to some is necessary for a good which
outweighs the overall harm and suffering and which cannot be acheived
by any better means. McCann writes that God's moral injunctions are
probably "what he would have preferred in the abstract, apart from the
particular considerations that lead him to will finally that we engage in
acts that are sinful."12 But this is a strange claim if the aim of McCann's
theory is to defend the absoluteness of divine sovereignty. How can "par
ticular considerations" interfere with what God otherwise prefers? God is
the immediate cause of all that is not Himself. Either He can achieve His
goals without having to cause sin or He cannot. A sovereign God would
not need to act so repugnantly in order to bring about the good He envi
sions. But a God who caused sin when it was not necessary for a greater
good, would not be good.
McCann argues, to the contrary, that the sin is indeed necessary. The
point of our existence as created agents is that we might freely choose
committment to God.
But . . . a responsible choice in God's favor requires that we under
stand the alternative—which is to be at enmity with him. Guilt, re
morse, a sense of defilement, and the hopeless desolation of being cut
off from God cannot be understood in the abstract, because if they
are only understood abstractly they are not ours. Only through ex
perience can we understand what it means to be in rebellion against
God, and we gain that experience by sinning.13
McCann's explanation here makes some sense in an Anselmian uni
verse. God might permit sin, knowing that it might contribute to the good
of our understanding what it means for us to cut ourselves off from God.
(Though note that insisting that God foresees some good coming from
the evil is not at all the same thing as saying that God prefers that the evil
should occur.) And in Anselm's universe, since God does not cause decep
tion and the choice to reject God really must come only from ourselves,
the first-hand experience is not to be had without the sin. But McCann's
universe is different. God is the immediate cause of everything about us,
including all of our understandings. There is no room for any original
contribution from the side of the creature. If we have an understanding
of guilt, etc., it is because God causes in us the belief, the feeling, and
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whatever else belongs to our understanding of guilt, just as He causes
the sin which is the source of the guilt. But then McCann's claim that
only through the experience of sin can we have this understanding can be
shown to be false for several reasons.
First, God is a rational creator. He understands what He makes. He
cannot make in us the understanding of guilt, etc., without having the
understanding Himself. He cannot create in us the understanding of guilt
as our own without having that understanding. But God does not Himself
sin. Thus the understanding of guilt, etc. does not require the experience
of having sinned. In McCann's universe we are not at a sufficient distance
from God that we can see things from our own perspective which He does
not share. We cannot have beliefs and feelings and experiences which He
does not cause and which He does not understand exactly as we under
stand them. If we allow enough created autonomy to enable us to have a
perspective which is not reducible to ideas caused in us by God then we
have departed from McCann's position and have no reason to embrace the
claim that God causes sin.
So it is possible for someone, God at least, to understand guilt etc. with
out having sinned. One might suggest that creatures need to undergo the
experience of sin in order to have the understanding. But why? If God can
make the belief in us, the secondary causes involved in our actually hav
ing sinned are not necessary. For example, God could, having created in
us a choice to sin, to abuse a child, let's say, then create in us a very vivid,
but false, experience that we are carrying through with the sinful deed,
though in fact we are not. Or perhaps He could create us on the doorstep
of heaven with a life-time's worth of false memories of having sinned,
done the sinful deed, and ultimately repented. Presumably the under
standing of what it is to be cut off from God would follow just as surely,
but no children would have to suffer. If the good goal to be acheived by
the sin is the understanding, and the understanding is created in us im
mediately by God, then the sinful deed with all the consequent harm and
suffering is unnecessary, and a memory of having sinned might do every
bit as well as actually having sinned.14
Can McCann argue that this option of deception is not open to God
since a good God does not deceive? No. As we have seen, McCann's God
deceives when He issues commands which, at least in the case of many
towards whom they are directed, He does not really want to have obeyed,
and which He knows it is impossible to obey. And in any case, if creating
us sinning does not entail that God sins, creating us deceived does not en
tail that God is a deceiver. Certainly people are in fact very often deceived.
For the Anselmian, all that has ontological status in the mistaken belief is
made and sustained by God, but the mistake itself can be attributed to our
fallenness, and hence deception originates with the created agent. For Mc
Cann, we do not ultimately contribute anything of which God is not the
immediate cause, and so any instance of deception is caused by God. So
McCann cannot argue that God would not create in us false beliefs regard
ing our sins and sinful deeds. But then a theodicy which holds that God
must cause actual sin, and sinful deeds, and the terrible consequences we
see in the world, because He needs all of this horror to produce our under
standing of guilt etc.does not do the job.
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The Requirements of Moral Agency
McCann argues, in the final section of his paper, that his view allows the
created agent sufficient moral autonomy. He sees two criteria for agency,
first, a feeling of spontaneity, "that we do, rather than undergo" and sec
ond, intentionality. Both of these features are "fully compatible with God's
role as First Cause of our acts of will." And they are "all that is needed to
make me a morally authentic being."15 The Anselmian agrees with the first
claim, but that means he must disagree with the second. In fact, though
McCann claims to subscribe to the libertarian view of freedom, his conclu
sions here fit well with compatibilism.16 Take Anselm's example of some
one who has only a single, god-given desire. In choosing in accordance
with his only desire he fullfills McCann's two criteria. He rightly feels that
he is an actor who has done something, and not just a passive receiver who
has undergone something. And he understands and means to be mak
ing his choice. It is intentional. Compatibilists standardly offer this sort
of example as exhibiting fully-determined free choice. Anselm insists it
is not free in the relevant sense. In this situation the rational agent is like
the horse or the dog in that he can do only what he is created by God to
do. The created free agent needs genuinely open options—a requirement
which McCann does not discuss, but one which is almost always held to
be the sine qua non of a libertarian analysis of freedom. If we cannot choose
other than God creates us choosing, how can we bear any ultimate respon
sibility for our choices? On Anselm's analysis the reason the created agent
needs open options is so that he can make a choice which is genuinely from
himself. Perhaps McCann can claim for created agents a sort of "second
ary" autonomy, but in that God is the ultimate author of their choices this
sort of "autonomy" does not capture what libertarians see as requisite for
moral responsibility.
A Dangerous Universe
McCann is right that this Anselmian position concludes to what many will
see as difficult consequences. We must grant that "our deeds and judg
ments . . . lead the course of providence, so that God must somehow ad
just his behavior to ours, or work around us to achieve his ends."17 But
on Anselm's account, this limitation is imposed by God on Himself when
He chooses to create free agents who will have some share in His aseity.
On McCann's analysis God is even more limited. He needs sin to achieve
His goals. And presumably this need is not something He has chosen for
Himself. If He could achieve His goals without the sin, but chooses sin as
the means, His goodness is called into question.
If it is argued that, on Anselm's account, it could turn out that no one
is saved, I find that a logical entailment of the system, but not a serious
concern. Given God's omnipotence, through which He can produce as
many created agents as He wants and continue to work good for them, it
seems so statistically remote as to be uninteresting. But just for the sake
of argument allow the worst case scenario in which every human being
does freely reject saving grace. Then, if it were really the best, God could
step in and turn us into the kind of beings McCann already believes us to
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be. God could create (McCann style) good willings in us, so that heaven is
properly populated. But in this case He would be the author only of a sort
of good, not of sin. The Anselmian is not really happy with this solution,
since it trades on the suggestion that God might radically diminish our
metaphysical stature as agents and by creating a "secondary" goodness
in us, make us incapable of genuine moral responsibility, all of which the
Anselmian sees as a harm to us. But McCann himself cannot direct this
criticism against the proposal, since in his view our having this diminu
tive metaphysical stature and only secondary goodness is completely con
sistent with God's goodness.
McCann concludes his paper with the observation that if we could pos
sess what I label primary agency our decisions would not "become more
spontaneous, or our intentions more sincere. . . . The only change would
be that our wills would finally be out of God's reach—just as Adam and
Eve wished they could be. And then we could never rest fully in God's
providence, and so could never be safe."18 Here we come to what may be
a deep-seated and powerful motivation to abandon the Anselmian view. If
we are primary agents free to reject God then each of us must daily face the
real fear that we might just up and choose to turn our back on Him. At any
time we might just choose to cut ourselves off from our one chance at last
ing happiness. It seems to me that this is a genuine fear and an important
issue for libertarian theists. It deserves more consideration than I can give
it here, but let me perhaps start the discussion by making two observa
tions. First, Anselm himself argues that it is possible for the created agent
to arrive at a point where he need no longer fear that he will reject God. We
are motivated only to choose what we believe will make us happy. If, on
our own, we have chosen justice, eventually we can arrive at a stage where
we see nothing to desire which falls outside of the will of God. This is the
condition of the good angels (and presumably, the saints) now. By their
own efforts they have placed themselves beyond the possibility of sinful
desire.19 They no longer have moral options, nonetheless they are free be
cause it is "from themselves" that they have arrived at this point. So it is
possible, on the Anselmian account, to reach safe haven eventually.
But for us still walking through the dark valley, the fear cannot be dis
missed. Anselm holds that it is possible for us, even having received the
grace requisite for salvation, to reject it. God does not ask much of us.
He does not expect us to, per impossibile, generate some goodness out of
ourselves. All we need do is to hang on to what He has given us. But we
might fail at even that minimal task. If we have experienced the joy and
comfort of faithful belief, we may judge that it would be madness and
near impossible for us to abandon it. But, at least for most of us, we may
feel that constancy is not an absolute certainty. This side of the grave we
are not 100 percent safe.
But is not the same true on McCann's view? You may today be the
most virtuous person and feel assured of heaven, and tomorrow God
may rewrite your character as one fallen from grace, sinning and eternally
damned. Perhaps you can "rest" and feel "safe" in that, whatever hap
pens, it is exactly what God wants to have happen, but this will not be
much comfort to you if you are finally and completely cut off from God.
Even worse. From the Anselmian perspective God is the absolute source
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and standard of all truth and all charity. Hatred and deception are a fall
ing away from God. If it should turn out that He is instead an unloving
deceiver, then the world is turned upside down and there is no safety any
where, ever. It is not clear that a universe of atoms and the void is worse
than the "safety" of such a God. The Anselmian position involves two
costs: our choices are not perfectly intelligible, and God's omnipotence is
limited by His own choosing. This seems a small price to pay for the assur
ance that God is not, after all, the author of sin.
University of Delaware
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dom of the Will 8. The point that all creatures have a sort of "rightness" of which
God's nature and will are the standard comes through most clearly in the last
two chapters of On Truth.
11. One proof text for this point is Anselm's response to Gaunilo (section
8). The latter had criticized the Proslogion argument by insisting that we can
not have any concept of "that than which no greater can be conceived."
12. McCann (2005) p. 151.
13. Ibid. p. 153.
14. This suggestion fits well with McCann's own occasionalist leanings.
See "The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism" (with Jonathan
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Kvanvig) Philosophical Perspectives 5 ed. J. E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991) pp. 587-615.
15. McCann (2005) pp. 156-57.
16. McCann's approach echoes that of Augustine, who is clearly a compatibilist. See my “Augustine's Compatibilism" Religious Studies 40 (2004) pp.
415-35.
17. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo is an effort to show how the fall made the
Incarnation “necessary"—necessary in the sense that God, being the best, in
evitably does the best.
18. McCann (2005) p. 158.
19. On the Fall o f the Devil chap. 25.

